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ABSTRACT
Price controls were part of Israel's stabilization program of
July 1985. Some results of the program seem to be inconsistent
with competitive macroeconomic models. It is suggested that these
results are consistent with an economy that has an oligopolistic
market structure. The paper explores the effects of market






(617) 253—2655The iirpetus for the current study cones from an attenpt to understand the
results of Israel'sstabilizationprogram of July 1985. The programconsisted
ofa sharp reduction in aggregate spendingriiaan increaseinnettaxesand a
fliDderatereduction in gorlernnent spending, a devaluation fo11od by a fixed
exchange rate, and price and ge controls. The results of theprogram are
reported in Table 1. In the first quarter thatfolloedthe inpienentation of
the program, i.e., the third quarter of 1985, aggregate spendingdeclined,
exports increased, inports declined, the real ge rate declined, and
enployi-rentdeclined. Theseresultscan be explained bya con'entional
conpetitive nacroeconomic nodel, as I will show inSection II.
Duringthe nextsix months all the variables reversedtheir course.' This
uld heeasyto explainwitha conventionalcoirpetitive node! ifthe price
controlshadbeen reiroved. Houer, they re not, andit isdifficult to
reconcilethe conDuenent of the reported variables in their presence.
1The Table reports theconsunption ge rate; i.e., the nominal ge rate
divided by the cost of living index. Hover, the product 'ge rate; i.e., the
nominal qe rate divided by the o lesa le price index, shows a similar
pattern,axceptfor the first t quarters of 1985 thich are before the
stabilization program. This is seen from the following data on the quarterly
rates of price increase (taken from Table C—3 in the Bank of Israel ilnnual
Report, 1996):
85—I 85—Il85—Ill 85—IV 86—I
consuner prices 297. 47/. 487. 97. 17. olesaleprices 27/. 367. 447. 7/. 47.
The enpicynent data in the Table concerns total enploynent. Hoeuer, thesane
pattern energes from the data on enployuent in the buisiness sector or in
nanufacturing. Innanufacturing,£or exarrple, theeuclution of the
corresponding seasonally adjusted euploynent data from the first quarter of
1985 to the first quarter of 1986 is (taken from in Israel Economic Data,
Research Departnent, Bank of Israel, Nay 26, 1985): 312, 310, 305, 311, 315.—2—
Especially intriguing is thesinultaneousincrease in the real ge rate and
enplovnent. This is so, becauseina conpetitive rnxlel price controls lead to
excess demand. In this case increasedspendinghasnoprice or esploynent
effects, thile a ge increase reducesenployuent.The difficulty is further
aggravated by thefactthat contrary to the irodel's prediction, alnost no
shortages have been observed. In addition, as sho;xiin Section II, partial
relaxation of price controls is also incapable of explainingthedatawith
this type of a nodel. This lead ne to study a macroeconomicnudel with
oligopolistic markets. I have chosen to rk withaparticular form of
iiiperfect con-petition, thich proves to be usefulfor the purpose at hand.It
is.houer,possibleto think about alternatives thich are also of interest.
Clearly, it is pointless to cover all these alternativesin a single article.
hlthoughthe current investigation vsirotivatedbytheIsraeli
experience,its results are of wider interest. This stems from thefact that
price controls have also been used in the recentstabilization efforts in
argentina andBrazil,and they are seriousely considered byother couctries
thatcontenplate stabilization,such as !xico.
It turnsoutthat boththe conpetitive and the nonconpetitive nodels
generate similar predictions intheabsenceofprice controls, but that in
their presence the nodels' predictions differ substantially. Thedetailsof
these differences are interesting; they show how macroeconomic performance may
dependonmarketstructure.ThisissLeis themain thene of the paper.
Thenextsection is devoted to a study oftheeffects of price controls
ona singleconpetitive and nonconpetitive industry. This partial equilibrium—3-.
analysis clarifies a njor effect of nBrket structure. In the following
section (Section II) I construct a siule, conpetitiie, ntzltisectoreconomy,
and study its inlicat ions for the contuirent of uariables in the presence of
price controls. In Section III I construct a nDdel with oligopolistic
con-petition and study the sane set of questions. The reader can see in Table
2 soire of the resulting differences. £n application of these theoretical
findings to the Israeli case is illustrated in Section IV.It is argued that
the mn-plications of the corrpetititie nodel are inconsistent with the data,
v.tiile the inplications of the nonccmpetitiue nodel are consistent ;nth them.
I. Partial FuiIibrjum
fin inportant insight into the effects of price controls tn-ider different
irerket structures can be obtained from a partial equilibrium analysis.
Consider Fig. 1. Panel (a) describes a conpetititye industry. Without price
controls the equilibrium price is p, viich is determined by the intersection
of the nrg inc I cost cur'e !t andthedenBnd curt,e D. Now, if price
controls reduce the price to p°, then there is an excess denund fiB. In this
case the actually transacted quantity is determined by point f, thich
represents the short side of the nurket. Hence, output is supply determined,
and price controls bring about a contraction of output.
Now consider panel (b), kich describesafirm with sone degree of
nonopoly poer. Curie D describes the dei-rand curi,e faced by the firm, with
the associated nurginal re'enue curue PIR.Its nurginalcost curt.veis
Without price controls the equilibrium quantityof outputand salesis—4-.
determined by the intersection of with ?t, and the equilibrium price is
found on the demand curve at the point that corresponds to this quantity.
Hence, p is the equilibrium price. Now suppose that price controls are
iapasad, with p being the price ceiling. Then the £ irm' s marginal revenue
cur.'e becorres the horizontal line at the level p up to point C,then it
drops to F, and coincides with NR for larger outputlevels. In this case
profit maximization makes the firm supply the entire demandat the controlled
price. This is true for euery price ceiling above point E. Hence, as long as
the price ceiling is aboue E, there is no excess demand, output is demand
determined, and price controls bring about an expansion of output.These
results are radically different from those derived for the conpetitir.e case.
Only en price controls are severe enough to reduce the price belowE will
shortages appear. Take, for exaiple, p to be the price ceiling.Then the
reletiant marginal ret7enue curve becorres the horizontal line up to B, dropping
from B to G, and coinciding with !IR £ or higher output levels. In this
case point represents the intersection of the marginal revenue with the
marginal cost curve, vhile point B represents the demanded quantityat the
controlled price. Hence, there is an excess demand equal to .Observe,
hot.ier, that in this case too output is higher than in theuncontrolled case,
despite there being shortages. Only then the price ceiling fallsbelow the
intersection of 1R with It do price controls bring about shortages with a
lor level of output.
This analysis shows that in a conpetititie market price controls lead to
shortages and a decline of output, with the output level supplydetermined. On—5—
the otherhand, in a narket with oligopolistic firms, nuderate price controls
do not lead to shortages,and output——thichis denund determined—-increases.
harve, therefore, a potential explanation of the lack of shortages in the
Israeli economy, that '.s discussed in the introduction. In order to see that
this explanation is also consistent with the data reported in Table 1, need
to derelop a nore elaborate nudel, taking into account sonu general
equilibrium interactions. Hou'er, since it is not the purpose of this paper
to study in detail the Israeli economy, but rather to point out the inportance
of narket structure for macroeconomic performance in the presence of price
controls, I first discuss in sonu detail the perfectly conpetitive case.
II.PerfectConpetition
Consider a conpetitire economy that produces tw coimuxlities: a traded
product that is exported but not consuned donestically, arid a nontraded
product. Their production functions are f.(.e.),i=X,M,respectively, ere
.e.islabor use of a representatir.ie firm in sector i. The functions f.(.)
are strictly concave, thich can be justified by the existence of firm specific
inputs. Sector i is conposed of n. firms and aggregate labor supply is
L.(The nunter of firms plays no essential role in this section; it is
introduced in order to facilitate a conparison with the next section.)
Domastic consuners have honothetic preferences over the nontraded product
arid the iirported product. These preferences inply that the share of spending
on product i,i=N, I (iiere I stands for inports) is an honogeneos
function of degree zero of consuner prices p., i=N,I. The share functions—6—
arerepresentedby In vtat follows prices andaggregatedenand are
weasuredin terms of foreign currency. Hence,ifE represents aggregate
spending in terms of foreign currency, then the foreign currency value of
spending on good i is si(PN,PI)a
Foreign demandfordonestic exports is H(p7). The price elasticity of
export demand is assuned to be larger than one (in absolute value).The
foreignsupply price of donestic irrports is p.









T pxH(P) — (6)
tthere w is the nge rate and T is the trade balance surplus, both neasured
in terms of foreign currency. Equations (1)-(2) represent the conpetitive
pricing conditions, ;chile (3)—(5) represent clearing conditions in the labor—7—
market, the export market, and the market for nontraded goods, respectively.
Equation (6) defines the sw-plus in the trade account. Given the level of
spending E, this system provides a solution for the equilibrium values of
prices the vage rate w, labor allocations x'N' and the
surplus in the trade account T.
Aggregate spending canbenodeled in many vnys. It can, for exanple, be
derived from intertenporal optimization subject to an intertenporal budget
constraint only——provided capital markets are perfect—-or with additional
2 constraints if capital markets are inperfect (such as liquidity constraints).
An extrene form energes if no borrowing and lending are possible, in kiich
case spending has to equal incone. Naturally, v are interested in the
effects of changes in aggregate spending. These may result from policy changes
2The following is an exanple ofan expenditure function that is derived from
interternporal maximization in the presence of perfect capital markets. Let
the intertenporal utility function be exp(-pt)[ln cN(t) +In
c1(t)]dt,
vAiere p is the subjective discount rate, t is a tine index! cN(t) is
consunption of nontradeables at tine t, and c1(t) is consunption of
inportables at tine t. Then the maximization of this function subject to the
intertenporal budget constraint Cexp(—rt)[pN(t)cN(t) +p1(t)c1(t)Jdt￿
vtere r is the interest rate (assuned to be constant) and is the
present value of future net incone plus current bond holdings, yields the
expenditure function E(t) =pexp[(r -p)tJ140,ttere
E(t) e PN(t)cN(t) +p1(t)c1(t).Hence, expenditure is rising over tine if the
interest rate is larger than the private discount rate and it is declining
over tine if the interest rate is smaller than the private discount rate.
Another representation of this expenditure function is by neans of
E(t) =p14(t),;tere 14(t) =exp{(r -p)t]140 is the present value of future
incone plus current bond holdings in period t.—8-
or from changes in economic circumstancesIt is, houer,alyspossible to
deconosea change in aggregate spending into an autonous conponent anda
couponentthatisgenerated by feedbacks from theeconomicsystem. Sincethe
details of this deconposition introduce technical conplications without adding
insights to the problem at hand, I hac'echosen to treat aggregate spendingas
exogeneous. The technical difficulties inuolved in a detailed nodellingof
these interactions can he seen by considering the feedback from price controls
to spending, ;thich is of particular interest in the curent contex. Clearly,
price controls affect incon in the tine interal in ;thich they apply, thereby
affecting ;alth thirh consists partly of the present tjalue of incone. Since
spending depends on alth price controls affect spending this channel.
Ibreouer, as a result of shortages in periods of price controls consuners are
typically not able to attain the nest desirable allocation of spending across
goods. Under these circumstances they ny choose to reallocate spending Oxier
tine in order to minimize the trntility loss from these constraints. This
represents another channel through ich price controls affect spending. It
is clear from this discussion and from further reflection that spending
depends on price controls in a conplicated y; it depends on the nature of
controls, on the preuailing rationing mschanism in case of shortages, their
timing, and the like. For this reason I ha.'e chosen to treat spending as
exogeneousfor thepurpose of thisst.dy.3
3Taking, for exanpie, the expenditure function described in the precJious
footnote it is straightforrd to see that an unexpected increase in tax rates
attine thas a direct effect on W(t) through the reduction of the present
ualue of' future net incone, and an indirect effect through changes in the
present tTalue of gross incone flows. Price controls change W(t) throughIn the unrestricted couipetitit,e equilibrium described by (l)-(6)an
increase in aggregate spendinQbringsabout an expansion of thenontraded
goodssectorand a contraction of the exportables sector (labor shifts from
the latter to theforrrer);the price of exports and the price of nontradeables
increase, with the foriir rising proportionately less than the latter. Inorts
increase and exports decline, bringing about a decline in the trade account
surplus. These are standard responses. HoeTer, in anticipation of the
analysis of price controls, it is convenient to use for this analysis a
reducedformsystem, kiich I detielop inat follo
Let R(pX,pN;L) he thedouresticproduct ftiction for this economy,
defined by
ff(PH,PN;L) =iix{pnf(.) + PNrINE(.CN) s.t. +n4N L}. C
Thisfunctionen-bodies conditions (2)—(3), it is positiuely linear
honngeneous in prices, conoae in labor input, its partial deriuatiue with
respectto a price equals the outputlevelof the corresponding connDdity, and
its partial deriuatiue with respect to labor inputequalsthe conpetitiue ge




their effet on gross incone flows.- 10-
kiereJI.(.)isthe partial derii,atiue of Jl()withrespect to p1 and p1
satisfies (1). Giien the price of isports and aggregate spending, conditions
(7)-(8) determine the price of exports and the price ofnontradeables This
solution is depicted in Fig. 2. The ci..u'ueXXdescribes (7) Jiile the
curie MN describes (8). Both ct,es are uprds sloping; /Ndeclines
along XX and rises along NM (see Nrndel1 (1971, clip. 9)for a similar
diagram). Point is the equilibrium point.
Now suppose that aggregate spending increases. Then the NM curue
shifts to the right and the new equilibrium point is B. t B both prices
are higher, hut the relati'e price of exports is 1or. Hence,the price of
exports increases proportionately less than the price ofnontradeailes. It is
now clear from (7)—(8) that at B exports are lo;rand output of
nontradeables is higher than at l. The increase in the price of
nontradeables relati've to ixports increases the share of spending on inports.
Together with the initial increase in aggregate spendingthis increases the
talue of inparts. Since the higher price of exports reduces export earnings
(under the assunpt ion that the price elasticity of exportdemand is larger
than one) the trade account surplus declines. Finally, since both pricesof
donestic output increase, the ge rate --gi7enby w = ——also
increases.
The next step is to consider price controls. is explained in the
introduction, the nntiiation for this analysis comas from the use of price
controls in stabilization programs. This takes typically the following form.
There is a currency deualuation, vhile domastic currency prices are not— 11—
allodto be raised by the full extent of the deialuation. The exchange rate
is frozen and price controls are neintained. In this case prices of
controlled products decline in terms of foreign ctu"rency. If, for exanple,
donestic inport prices and prices of nontradeables are frozen following the
deualuat ion, then p1 and decline by the sane proportion, Iiich equals
the rate of deualuation. If only nontraded goods are under price controls,
p1 does not change ile declines. The price of exportables is assuned
to be uncontrolled.
If inport prices are controlled, then inporters cease inporting, because
the donestic price does not couer unit costs.4 This generates an excess
demsnd for iirports and disequilibrium in the inort nerket. The forced
reduction in the price of nontradeabies generates also disequilibrium in the
market for nontraded goods, thich not.,es into a state of excess demand. If
there is no decline in desired agaregate spending, the economy experiences
forced satYings. In this case one expects to obserue shortages of the type
that appeared in Brazil after the iirplenentation of its stabilization program
4The result that ider conpetitionprice controls lead to the ceasation of
inports dependsonthe y the inporting actiuity is nDdelled. I use in the
text the standard nodelling procedure. If, houer, one assunes that
inportables haue to be con-Iined with donestic inputs in order to supply
donestic demand (as, for exanpie, in Sanyal and Jones (1982)), then price
controls only reduce inports. This can be nodelled, for exanpie, by assuming
that there are inputsspecificto the inport industry, so that final output of
inportables is giuen by F 1(m), there niisthe quantity iirported and
is strictly concaue. Then inporters maximize p1f1(m) —pm,and a reduction
in p1 does not lead to m =0.The nodel in the text assunes F 1(m) =m.
Obser"e, hoveuer, that our main results do not depend on the .ey inports are
being nodelled.— 12—
in1986. In terms of Fig. 2 (in vtich point A describestheequilibrium
withoutprice controls), if price controls lead to the decline of the price of
nontradeables to p, then the econony ends up at point C, at vtich there
is clearing of the export irarket (vtich is not controlled) and there is excess
delTand for nontraded goods. Hence, price controls lead to a decline in the
price of exportables, but proportionately less than the price of
nontradeables. The result is thatexportsincrease andinportsdecline (to
zero), bringing about an inprovenent in the trade accotmt. Naturally, the
expansion of the export industry is associated with a contraction of the
nontraded goods sector, thereby aggrauating excess denand in that narket.
Finally,since both prices of donestic output decline, so does the vage rate
w=Lx'N'-4
If labor resists vage reductions, there is tmenploynent.
Itreover,since declines proportionately irore thanp,andw
declinesby a vighted atverage of the decline in and then w
declines proportionately less than Therefore, if is the
consunerprice index (there theftrnctionQ(')ishonogeneous of degree one),
thenthe real consuirpt ion vagerate w/Q increases as a result of price
controls.
It is noweasy to see that the analysis doesnotchange nuch if inport
prices are not controlled. Naturally, in this case there is no excess denand
in the market for inportables, butthereis still excess demand for
nontradeables. In terms of Fig. 2, point C still describes thenew
equilibrium point. Hence, the price of exportables declines proportionately
less than the price of nontradeables, exports expand and output of— 13—
nontradeablescontracts. The difference arises in the trade accout. Now
inports do not drop to zero. In fact, giten aggregate spending E, the
trnsatisfied denand for nontradeables spills over to inports, so that the
inport bill becones E -PNN(PX,PN;L).Hovver, using the equilibrium




Hence, since p and N decline, donestic product declines and there is a
deterioration in the trade accotrnt. Now w/PN increases hut w/p1declines,
sothat w/Qnay increase or decline.
Naturally,if the initial situation is one with effective price controls,
then partial relaxation of these controls has opposite effects. These are
presented in the first row of Table 2 for the case in ttich inport prices are
also controlled (vkiich is the relevant case for Israel).
The next set of issues to be considered concerns the effects of shifts in
aggregate spending and labor stqply in the presence of price controls. First,
consider aggregate spending. If both inports and nontradeables are
controlled, then with effective price controls in place, snaIl changes in
aggregate spending do not affect prices or sectoral allocations, nor do they
affect the trade account. Rather, an increase in aggegate spendingbrings
aboutlarger forced savings vtile a decline in aggregate spending brings about
snaller forced savings. If, on the other hand, inport prices are not
controlled, changes in aggregate spending do not affect prices andresource— 14—
allocationas ll. This tine, hoei,er, they do affect the trade account,
because all of the change in aggregate spending is reflected in inports.
Hence, an increase in aggregate spending increases inports, bringing about a
decline in the trade accotmt stu-plus.
Since (7)is satisfied also in thepresenceof price controls1 an
increase in labor input L, ihich leads to an excess supply of exportables if
prices do not change, brings about a decline in the price of exports (in terms
of Fig. 2, the cur'e XX shifts dovxrds, and so does point C) and an
expansion of output in the exporting industry. The v.ge rate w =HL(PX,PN;L)
declines as a result of both the increase in L and the decline in p.
Hence, the real consuvrption ge rate w/Q also declines. Therefore, output
of nontradeables rises (see (2) for i=N), thereby reducing the excess demsnd
for them. Inports do not change if inport prices are controlled and they
decline if inport prices are not controlled (due to the fact that additional
supply of nontradeables reduces the spilloer of excess denend into
inportables), thile export earnings increase. The result is an inprot.iemsnt in
the trade accouct. Natt-ally, the sane results obtain if the ge rate is
reduced and enplcyner-it is a.l1od to adjust. These results are sunrized in
the upper part of Table 2 for the case in thich inport prices are also
controlled.
III. Inperfect Coupetiticwi
Now consider an identical econow, except for the fact that the nontraded
and the inportab Ia products are differentiated. (I could haue assuned that— 15—
theexportableis also a differentiated product, butthisvzuld haure added no
newdirrrensionto theproblemat hand.) Lettherebe n1 uarieties of the
inportable, each onebeinginported by a different agent.fl typical irrporter
hasthe exclush'eright to market one 7ariety. The ntnther of inporters and
producersof nontraded .arieties is constant in theshortrti, ich is the
releurant tima span for the ctz'rent discussion. Consumar preferences for
urarieties are syrnietrical and of the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz type (seeSpence
(1976) andDixitandStiglitz(1977)). Hence,the elasticityof demand for a





SinceE.islarger than one, o.is positiueand smallerthanone (see the
Lippendix for a precise deriurat ion of thedemand elasticitiesandthespending
share£Trnctions).
Themarket£ or inportables is oligopolistic, andsois the market for
riontraded goods.typical conpetitor in one of these markets sets its price,
taking as giuren prices of riuals, total spendingonthe product, andthege
rate. Hence, prices are set so as to equate marginal reuenuetomarginal
costs. Defininga,a1,the pricing equations (l)-(2) are nowreplacedby:
alp]: = (I')
=w,i=X,N (2')— 16—
.hileconditions (3)-(6) renain "alid. This describes the equilibrium
without price controls.
fis before, it is possible to use a reduced form representation of this
equilibrium by neans of the function H(), despite the fact that it no longer






ere )T(.) stands for the partial deriuat i',e of 1i( )withrespect to the
second argirnerit (i .e.,
Fig. 2 can be used again, with representing points that satisfy (7')
and NM representing points that satisfy (8'), and the intersection point fi
describing the resulting equilibrium. fn increase in aggregate denend shifts
the NH ctu-'.'e to the right and the equilibrium point to B. The results are
the sane as in the ccmpetitive economy: exports decline, output of nontraded
goods expands, prices of exportables and nontradeables increase, with the
forner rising proportionately less. The tialueofexports declines ile the
uralue of inports increases, and there is a decline in the trade account
stnp lus.
Now consider price controls. Suppose that a det.ialuation and controls on
nominal prices lead to an equiproportional decline of and p1 (the reader— 17—
isencouraged to also consider thecasein thich price controls apply only to
nontradeables). hs longasp1 renins larger than p, inporting remains a
profitable acti,ity (renenber the discussion in Section 2 and thatinitially
p1 =p/a.) p), so thatinportingdoes notcease.Noreouer, mderthese
circumstances it is profit nexinüzing to inport as nuchascan be sold, so
that inports are demand determined. Similarly, a cut in the price of
nontradeables plus price controls make their producers supply the demanded
quantity at the new price. This is profit maximizing. Hence, theoutputof
nontradeables is also demand determined. 1ll this neans thatconditions
(3)—(6) remain 'alid in the face of price controls. (If p1 ( p, inports
cease, and (5) is replaced withT =p.X(p.)).Consequently, (5) inpliesart
expansionofoutput in the nontraded goods sector, leading (uia (3))toa
contractionof the exportables sector. The contraction of exports requires a
higher export price (see (4)), leading to lor export ret.7enue. Point C' in
Fig. 2 describes the resulting price configuration. Since inports increase
;thile export rexyenue declines,thetrade accout rsens. The effect on mages
is fotn-id by obseruing that price controls int.ialidate (2')fornontradeables
only, and that itremainsualid for exportables. Therefore, a higher price of
exportables and lor enplovnentintheir production requires a higher wsge
rate w, and inplies a higher real consnmt ion cage w/Q.
The economic story that energes from this analysis is as follows. fn
equiproportionalreductionof inport prices and prices of nontradeables
expandsdemandfor inports andfornontradeables. ?tmopolistic suppliers find
itprofitable to supply the entire demand. Consequently, producers of— 18—
nontradeablesincrease their deilEndforlabor, thereby bidding up the ;ge
rate. The ige hike increases irginal costs in the production of
nontradeables and exportables. Ho',er, as long as rginal costs of producing
the higher denwid of nontradeahies does not exceed the controlled price, the
incentive to supply the entire denerid does not change. In the export sector
increased nrginaI costs lead to 1or output and a higher price. Nattu'ally,
the export surplus declines.
These results of price controls are oust the opposite from the results
for a conpetitite economy. The irein reason for the difference is that "thile
Lulder price controls in a conpetiti.ie economy output is supply constrained, in
an oligopolistic entjironnent with price setting firms it is denend
constrained, as explained in Section 2. Since price reductions increase denand
and reduce coiietitiue supply, they are contract ionary in a conpetitive
en'ironnent and expansionary in an oligopolistic ent.iironnent. The results for
a relaxation of price controls, thich are opposite to the results of their
iirposition, are reported in the fourth row of Table 2.
How consider the results of an increase in aggregate spending in the
presence of price controls. Renener that in a conpetitit,e ent.;ironnent this
leads to only larger forced sa'ings *ien inport prices are also under control,
and to only larger inports if inport prices are riot under control. In the
current settup things differ substantially. Higher aggregate spending brings
about the expansion of the nontraded sector (see (5)) and the contraction of
the exporting sector (see (3)). Consequently, the price of exportables rises
and inport ret.ienue declines. Higher aggregate spending also increases inports,— 19—
sothatthe export surplus declines. The v.ge rate w rises (see (2') for
i=X), and so does the real ge rate w/Q. The sane results obtain then
iiiport prices are not controllech
Next consider an increase in labor use L vkule the price controls
remain effectitie. It is clear that in this case output of nontradeables does
not change, because it is demand determined and denand has not changed (see
(5)).Hence,all of the additional labor is absorbed in the exporting sector
(see (3) and (4)),bringingabout an expansion of exports and a decline of its
price. Inparts do not change. Thevgerate declines, as one can see from
(2) for i=H, and so does the real ge rate w/Q. Clearly, if the source of
the disturbance is shifted from enlaynt to 'ages. then an exogeneous
decline in ges with anendogenous enp loynent adjustuentwilla i soproduce
theaboue described results. The results for the oligopolistic narket
structure are sunaarized in the lor part of Table 2.
It is now clear that in the presence of setveral industries, sone of thich
are conpetitiue and wiieofthich are oligopolistic, the net effect of price
controls will depend on the relatit.ie size of the conpetiti'e part of the
economy. In an economy with high concentration rates and a few snaIl
conpetiti,e sectors the outcone will be closer to that has been described in
this section. On the other hand, inan economywith a few highly concentrated
industries and nany large conpetitiue sectors the outcone will be closer to
;that has been described in the pre!iious section.
IV,.AnIllustration
The usefulness of our theoretical analysis canbe denenstrated by
applying itto the interpretation of the Israeli data reported in Table 1.- 20-
Recallthat theIsraeliprogram consisted of a sharpreduction in aggregate
spending,a de'ialuation follovd by a fixedexchangerate, and price andvge
controls. The letiel of controlled prices s fixed in domastic currency
units,ass the tinE pattern of ges. L:Ilthoughpricesvre controlled to
soiie extent at small retail outlets, rnst of the controlling v.s done at the
large nHrketing chains and directly on vkiolesale prices of large producers.
Giuen the largeconcentrationratios in Israel's industries, this 'as an
efficient xuthodofprice controls. Due to an agreenent withthe labor
unions, real ges re scheduled to increase after a period of set,eral
nnnths.
One can see in the first coltmn of the table that indeed during the third
quarter of 195 aggregate spending declined substantially, but that it began
toincrease in the fourth quarter. Real ges also declinedsharply inthe
thirdquarter,remained approximatelyat thesanelevel in thefourthquarter,
and rose sharply in thefirstquarter of 1986. On theotherhand,en'ploymant
dropped in the third quarter, andbeganto rise thereafter. Finally, exports
roseinitially and declined subsequently, ile iirports declined initially and
increased subsequently.
The conpetitiue as ll as the nonconpetitive rnDdel predict that a
reduction in aggregate demand without price-ge rigidities brings about an
expansion of exports, contraction of inports, and a decline in the vge rate.
If the ;•ge rate is not allod to decline by the full extent required for
full enp loynent, the enploynent level declines. Hence, one reason for the
introduction of ge controls vs to iroderate the undesirable enployirent
effects. (To other reasons re: to effect a reduction in aggregate spending— 21—
vialor ges and to eliminate the inertia from the inflationaryprocess.
See Brurio (1986) on the latter point.) Hence, the initial effects of the
program can he explained by both nodels, provided the price controls re not
effective or had only a sn 11 effect. Indeed, there are sone \thomight argue
that the initial sharp reduction of aggregate spending brought about
equilihrjthl-, prices below the inposed ceilings. It is, hover, reasonable to
argue on the basis of the intensive activity of the Ninistry of Industry and
Coniierce in the inpienentation of price controls ——includinglaw suits that
re filed against defiant sellers —-thateven if thepricecontrols v.re not
binding initially, they have certainly becone binding infaceof rising
spending in thefollowingnenths.
Takingthe view that price controls re effective starting at least with
thefotn-th quarter of 1985, it is clear that the conpetitive nodel discussed
in Section II does not explain the data in the table. Eenether that in the
conpetitiveflDdel with pricecontrolsan increase in desired aggregate
spendingdoes notchangesectoral enploynent levels,prices or ges. fluof
the additional desired spending translates into either forced savingsor
higher inports. If, in addition, there is an exogeneous vge increase,
enplovnent declines. Hence, the reported increase in aggregate spending, the
realge rate, and enploynent are inconsistent with this nodel (see the upper
part of Table 2) reover, there is no evidenceofsignificant shortages
dtn'ing that period, thich is also inconsistent with the conpetitit.'e node1.
Nowconsider the alternative specification, with price setting sellers
operating in oligopolistic narkets. Given price controls, a rise in aggregate- 22 -
spendingbrings about an expansion of the nontraded sector and a contraction
of the exporting sector. 1u11 dernnd is satisfied, so that there are no
shortages. Exports decline and iports increase. The price of exportables
increases and so does the ge rate that nintains a constant level of
euployliEnt. If the ge rate does not rise by the extent required to sece
constant euiploynent, eiiployiint increases, thereby ircderating the decline of
exports. This description is consistent with the data, provided the increase
in spending dominates the other effects (see the lor part of Table 2).
Natally, this is also consistent with the lack of shortages. The evidence
on the deree of concentration in Israeli nnufacttn'ing industries supports
the assunptionofsubstantial nnopoly po;r (see Brenn (1985, chp. 3)).
Itsee, therefore, that thenoncornetitiveiindel better explains this
episode. Nevertheless, one cannot be confident that thesodelconstructed in
Section II is indeed the urist approapriate for the Israeli econou Houer,
my results nke the point that an analysis of nacroeconomic perforuance tnider
price controls has to take explicit accotrnt of narket structt'e.
Tel flviv University, Tel flviv, Israel and
MIT, Canbridge, Massachusetts, U.S.a.— 23-
AFFU1DIX
This IIppendiR is de;oted to the specification of preferences, based on
Spence (1976) and Dixit andStiglitz(1977), which justifies a constant
elasticity dennd fiction for a representatitie seller. Thect.u-rent
presentation relies heavily on He1pnn and Krugnn (1985, ch.6).
The utility £tmction is:
U =U[t('),u()] (.1)
thereu.()isthe subutility of product i. TheftnictionU(') is
hthetic. Thestibutility ftrnctionu(') takes theform:
n./3. 11/3.
u.(D.,D.,...D. )= (E.'D.) ',0< /3.< 1 (14.2) i.il i2 in. j=l ij I
whereD. is consTrnption of variety j.If E. represents aggregate
spendina on product i,thenthe varietyspecific denndftrnctionsare:
-a.
1r
D..= F.,for all i, j, wherea. = >1.()
Ehlpih
The seller of variety jofproduct i takes E andp..,h j,as— 24—









In a syntric equilibrium p.. =forall j,and
E.= a.—(a.—1)/n.)i =N,I.
1 1 1 1.
Hence,the elasticity of deund is constant.





The allocation of aggregate expendituretoproducts cannow bedetermined
from:
I//3i—l TIxU[n EM/PM,n1 E1/p1]
st. EN+ E1.E.— 25—
Homtheticityof TJ(.) inplies thatthereexist share functions
=N,I,suchthatthesolutionto this problem canberepresented by:
E. =
withs.(.)beinga honDgeneousfts-iction of degreezero.Natt-al ly, the
sharefunctions depend on U() and on n. and$i=M,I.REF4CEB
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Israel
Index of Exports2 Inports2Index of Enployed
aggregate real ;ge persons
spending1 rate3
1985—I 356 1335 1591 126 1364
II 359 1397 1623 119 1352
III 320 1432 1497 102 1333
ItJ 331 1379 1673 101 1350
1986—I 344 1377 1714 115 1354
1
fkggreate spendinq is calculated aspriuatereal consunption
plus publicrealcansunption plus real inuestnnt. Thedata is
seasonallyadjusted.
Source: Table B—i from Main Israeli EconomicData, Research
Departnent, Bank of Israel (Septentier 2, 1986).
Millions of dollars in 1980 prices. Exports excluding
diaionds. luparts excluding diamnds and fuel.
Source: Table C—S from Main Israeli Economic Data, Research
Departnent, Bank of Israel (Septen-ber 15, 1985).
3 nthly aterages.
Source: Table(3—4from Main Israeli Economic DataResearch
Departn'ent, Bank of Israel (Septeirber 8, 1986).
Thousands,seasonallyadjusted.
Source:Table(3—S fromMain IsraelEconomic Data, Research










1cissuming thatinportprices are also controlled.
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